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DUE PROCESS
of due process. 102 Both courts have the same goal of
discouraging prosecutors from withholding exculpatory evidence
and ensuring that criminal defendants have a fair trial. However,
New York courts have implemented a higher burden for
prosecutors to meet in analyzing the failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence. As a result, defendants will have a
relatively easier burden of proof by pursuing a violation of a state
constitutional right to due process in a motion to vacate a
criminal conviction. The federal rule focuses more on the
materiality of the evidence and less on the actions of the
prosecutor.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. Douglas1 0 3
(decided October 27, 1994)
Defendant appealed his conviction of criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the fifth degree, in violation of New York
Penal Law section 220.06 (5).104 Defendant made a motion for
the court to review his conviction and retroactively apply the
scienter requirement to the weight element, as enunciated in the
subsequent decision of People v. Ryan. 105 Defendant claimed that
the state's evidence was insufficient. 10 6 He asserted that the jury
should have been precluded from finding him guilty since the
102. People v. Cwikla, 46 N.Y.2d 434, 441, 386 N.E.2d 1070, 1073, 414
N.Y.S.2d 102, 105 (1979) (recognizing prosecutor's obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence as "fundamental") (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963)).
103. 205 A.D.2d 280, 617 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1st Dep't 1994).
104. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 220.06 (McKinney 1989).
105. 82 N.Y.2d 497, 626 N.E.2d 51, 605 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1993). The
defendant was tried more than a year befbre 1)'an was decided. Douglas, 205
A.D.2d at 282, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
106. Douglas, 205 A.D.2d at 283, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
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state had failed to prove he knowingly possessed at least 500
milligrams of cocaine. 107
The Appellate Division, First Department in Douglas held that
Ryan should only be applied prospectively because retroactive
application of Ryan "would 'create a substantial burden on the
administration of justice and delay the disposition of countless
pending cases."' 108 Retroactive application would also have a
drastic effect on various narcotics-related evidentiary rulings. 109
Finding the evidence sufficient to support defendant's conviction,
the court found no denial of the defendant's constitutional due
process rights under either the State110  or Federal111
Constitutions. 112
The defendant was observed by the arresting officer, who was
watching from a distance of approximately fifteen feet and then
from approximately six feet, to be reaching into a brown paper
bag and dropping vials into an unidentified woman's hand. 113
The officer testified that the defendant appeared to have been
counting the number of vials as he was dropping them into the
woman's hand. 114 When the officer approached, the unidentified
woman fled and the defendant was arrested with the brown paper
bag containing thirty-one vials of cocaine. 115 A chemical analysis
performed on the contents of the thirty-one vials revealed that
they contained a total of 1,591 milligrams of cocaine. 116 The
107. Id.
108. Id. 205 A.D.2d at 291, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 739 (quoting People v.
Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d 519, 606 N.E.2d 1381, 591 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1992)).
109. Id.
110. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6. The provision states in pertinent part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
111. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The provision states in pertinent part: "[N]or
shall any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law. . ." Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The provision states in pertinent
part: "No state shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." Id.
112. Douglas, 205 A.D.2d at 292, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
113. Id. 282, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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defendant was indicted on March 5, 1992.117 He was charged
with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third
degree in violation of New York Penal Law section 220.65 and •
in the fifth degree in violation of New York Penal Law
section 220.06[5].118 Although the trial court denied the
defendant's motion to suppress the physical evidence obtained
upon his arrest, it allowed the suppression of various underlying
facts of the defendant's nine prior drug-related convictions. 119 At
the end of the presentation of all the evidence, the defendant
made a general motion to dismiss. 120 After a jury trial on August
27, 1992,121 the defendant was acquitted of the third degree
count, but was found guilty of the fifth degree count, the charge
of knowing and unlawful possession of 500 milligrams or more
of cocaine. 122 The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed
the conviction, sentencing the defendant to a prison term of two
and half to five years. 123
The court began its analysis by noting that, as in the case at
bar, in "the vast majority of pre-Ryan narcotics possession cases,
the prosecution, the defense and the trial.court operated under the
then common assumption that there was no scienter requirement
with respect to the weight element of a drug possession
charge." 124 The New York Court of Appeals in People v.
117. Id. at 281, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
118. N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 220.06, 220.65 (McKinney 1989) (pertaining to
knowing and unlawful possession of 500 milligrams or more of cocaine;
possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell). Douglas, 205 A.D.2d
at 281, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
119. Douglas, 205 A.D.2d at 281-82, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 733-34. From May
1986 to November 1987, the nine prior drug-related convictions consisted of
one misdemeanor possession, five misdemeanor sales, one criminal possession
of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, one attempted criminal sale in
the third degree, and one criminal possession of a, controlled substance in the
fifth degree. Id. Six of the nine convictions involved only marijuana and none
of the convictions involved the possession of cocaine. Id. at 294, 617
N.Y.S.2d at 741. (Rosenberger, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 282, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
121. Id. at 293, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
122. Id. at 283, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
123. Id. at 293, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
124. Id. at 282, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
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Ryan, 12 5 interpreted New York Penal Law section 220.18(5) and
found that "there is a mens rea element associated with the
weight of the drug." 12 6
New York Penal Law section 220.18(5) states that "[a] person
is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the
second degree when he knowingly and unlawfully
possesses: ... six hundred twenty-five milligrams of a
hallucinogen." 12 7 The Ryan court noted that in reading the
statutory language in context, the term "knowingly" not only
applied to the possession of something, "but also to the nature of
the material possessed." 128 The Ryan court reasoned that because
"the knowledge requirement carrie[d] through to the end of the
sentence, eliminating it from the intervening element -- weight --
would rob the statute of its obvious meaning." 12 9 The Ryan court
further explained that if a defendant did not need to have
knowledge of the weight, the criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the second degree would in effect be "a strict
liability crime" which was not the Legislature's intent.130
125. 82 N.Y.2d 497, 626 N.E.2d 51, 605 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1993). Although
the defendant was convicted of attempted possession of a controlled substance
in the second degree, the Ryan court construed New York Penal Law
§ 220.18(5) as meaning the completed crime. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d at 501, 626
N.E.2d at 53, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
126. Id. at 502, 626 N.E.2d at 54, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 238. In Ryan, the
defendant was arrested after receiving a package, substituted by the police,
containing only newspapers, but was assumed by the defendant to have
contained approximately two pounds of hallucinogenic mushrooms. Id. at 499-
50, 626 N.E.2d at 52, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 236. The defendant was convicted of
attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree
and sentenced to an imprisonment term of ten years to life. Id. at 501, 626
N.E.2d at 53, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 237. The appellate division affirmed the
conviction holding that the "knowingly" term should refer only to "'the
element of possession and not to the weight requirement.'" Id. (quoting People
v. Ryan, 184 A.D.2d 24, 27, 591 N.Y.S.2d 218, 220 (3d Dep't 1992)). The
court of appeals reversed and held that the "knowingly" mens rea requirement
does apply to the weight requirement. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d at 502, 626 N.B.2d at
54, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
127. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.18(5) (McKinney 1992).
128. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d at 502, 626 N.E.2d at 54, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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Although the defendant clearly attempted to possess two pounds
of hallucinogenic mushrooms, there was no evidence adduced at
trial supporting the assertion that the defendant knew the amount
of psilocybin, the hallucinogen in question. 131 Consequently,
because the state failed to show how much psilocybin would
typically have been in two pounds of hallucinogenic mushrooms,
which would link mushroom weight to psilocybin weight, the
Ryan court held that there was insufficient evidence at trial to
satisfy the weight of the drug knowledge requirement. 132
In the case at bar, the defendant, by raising the same
insufficiency of evidence argument, has effectively raised the
issue of whether such claim of insufficiency was preserved for
appellate review without making a specific objection at trial. 133
The court noted that the preservation issue may be analyzed in
two distinct ways. As set forth in People v. Cooper,134 relying
on People v. Kilpatrick,135 a Ryan claim is fundamentally a claim
concerning the sufficiency of evidence.136 The Cooper court held
that in all cases where the state fails to sufficiently prove the
Ryan "knowledge of weight" requirement, it amounts to a denial
of constitutional due process. 137 Thus, there is no requirement to
make a specific objection for the issue to be preserved for
appellate review. 138 The Kilpatriclc court, however, noted that in
assessing whether an issue has been preserved for appellate
131. Id. at 507, 626 N.E.2d at 57, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
132. Id.
133. Douglas, 205 N.Y.2d at 283, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
134. 204 A.D.2d 24, 618 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1st Dep't 1994). In Cooper, the
defendant was arrested after an officer observed the defendant with a plastic
bag containing white powder and then "she spontaneously exclaimed 'It's
coke' for which she had just paid $40." Id. The defendant was charged and
convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fiflh degree,
500 milligrams or more of "pure weight" cocaine in violation of New York
Penal Law § 220.06 (5). Id. Finding that there was no proof as to whether the
defendant knew the bag contained cocaine, or 500 milligrams or more of
cocaine, the court modified the conviction to a lesser degree of criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree. Id.
135. 143 A.D.2d 1, 531 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1st Dep't 1988).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Cooper, 204 A.D.2d at 27, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
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review, "it is important to distinguish a challenge addressed to
the sufficiency of the evidence from one involving a claim of
error in the trial court's charge or instructions to the jury." 139
Another view, expounded by the court in People v. Ivey, 140
purports that a Ryan claim is fundamentally a claim based on an
improper jury charge. 141 Under this view, the Ivey court held
that where the defense had failed to object to the court's jury
charge listing the elements of the crime, specifically, the
knowledge of the weight element, the improper charge defining
the element had not been preserved for appellate review as a
"question of law." 142 The Ivey court distinguished its case from
Kilpatrick by noting the Kilpatrick court's holding was
specifically based on the fact that there was insufficient trial
evidence pertaining to an element of the crime charged, not that
the jury was improperly instructed. 143 Thus, the court found that
there had been an improper jury charge but no "true insufficiency
challenge." The Ivey court concluded that without any specific
objection, the issue had not been preserved for appeal as a matter
of law. 144 The Ivey court's conclusion was based upon the New
York Court of Appeals' holding in People v. Dekle. 145 The
Dekte court held that:
139. Kilpatrick, 143 A.D.2d at 2, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
140. 204 A.D.2d 16, 618 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1st Dep't 1994). In Ivey, the
defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the
second degree in violation of Penal Law § 220.18(1), prior to the release of
the Ryan decision. Id. at 17, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 254. The court held that because
the defendant failed to raise the knowledge of the weight issue at trial, it was
unpreserved for appellate review. Id. at 19, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
141. Douglas, 205 A.D.2d at 283-84, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
142. Ivey, 204 A.D.2d at 18, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
143. Id.
144. d. at 19, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 255. Similarly, the Appellate Division,
Second Department in People v. Okehoffurm reached the same conclusion. 201
A.D.2d 508, 607 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2d Dep't 1994).
145. 56 N.Y.2d 835, 438 N.E.2d 101, 452 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1982). In
Dekle, the defendant was convicted of robbery in the third degree and petit
larceny for taking a radio from a store without purchasing it and subsequently,
drew a closed knife when confronted outside the store by a security guard. Id.
at 835, 438 N.E.2d at 102, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
[V/ol 11
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IThere [is no] due process violation when there is evidence from
which a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of
the crime as those elements were charged to the jury without
exception beyond a reasonable doubt. There is neither
constitutional nor jurisprudential error in permitting guilt to be
determined under a penal statute as construed by the common
assumption of both attorneys and the court. 146
This view is further supported in People v. Monclavo,147
where the court upheld a fifth degree narcotics conviction, which
had been tried prior to the decision in Ryan.14 8 In Monclavo, a
defendant picked up a paper bag containing crack-cocaine and
was arrested as he walked away with it.149 Citing Ivey, the
Douglas court held that the proof of knowledge of the weight
requirement was a jury charge question, and had not been
preserved as the defendant failed to timely object. 150
In a combination of these two views, the defendant in People v.
Gray1 5 1 raised both a Ryan claim and an improper jury charge
claim regarding his knowledge of the weight of the cocaine. 152
Although the Gray court declined to address the improper jury
charge claim, the court, in the case at bar, noted that there was
no need to review the improper jury charge as set forth in Gray
because the jury had been properly charged regarding the scienter
requirement to the weight of the drug. 153 The defendant's claim
146. 56"N.Y.2d at 836-37, 438 N.E.2d at 102, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
147. 620 N.Y.S.2d 378 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1995).
148. Id. at 378.
149. Id.
150. Douglas, 205 A.D.2d at 284, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 733 (1st Dep't 1994)
(citing People v. Ivey, 204 A.D.2d 16, 618 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1st Dep't 1994)).
151. 205 A.D.2d 353, 613 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1st Dep't 1994). In Gray, the
defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the
fourth degree for possessing over one eighth ounce of cocaine. Id. at 353, 613
N.Y.S.2d at 170. After finding that the trial evidence did not support the
conviction because the state failed to prove that the defendant Imew of the
weight of the drug, the court reduced the conviction to criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the seventh degree. Id.
152. Id. at 285, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
153. Id.
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was also preserved for appellate review without specific
exception pursuant to Kilpatrick. 154
In further support of its holding, the Douglas court referred to
People v. Gordon,155 which arrived at essentially the same
conclusion as did the court in Gray.156 The Gordon court
concluded that the defendant's Ryan claim was preserved for
appellate review without requiring that a specific objection be
made. 157 The court found that the jury had been properly
charged with respect to the "knowledge of the weight
requirement" and that there was no evidence brought forth at trial
that would satisfy "[a] statutory threshold in terms of pure weight
requir[ing] a showing of knowledge of both the aggregate weight
of the contraband and the purity of the substance.' 158
The court agreed with the general proposition espoused in
Cooper concerning a true sufficiency of evidence claim. For
example, when the state fails to prove the Ryan "knowledge of
weight" requirement, an essential statutory element of the crime
charged, it amounts to a denial of constitutional due process
requiring no specific objection for the issue to be preserved for
appellate review.1 59 The court disagreed that a violation of due
process "occurs, even where all parties to the trial operate under
the 'common assumption' that the legal test under which a
defendant's guilt is to be adjudicated does not require such proof
as is now required by Ryan.'160 The Ryan court, however, did
not explicitly address the issue of whether this new scienter
154. Id. at 285, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
155. 618 N.Y.S.2d 261 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1994). In Gordon, the
defendant was arrested with 50 vials of crack cocaine after the police observed
the defendant trafficking the drug on the street. Id. at 262. The defendant was
convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree
for possessing 1,283 milligrams of pure cocaine. Id.
156. Douglas, 205 A.D.2d at 285, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
157. Gordon, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
158. Id. The Gordon court reduced the conviction to criminal possession of
a controlled substance in the seventh degree. Id.
159. Id. at 736 (citing Cooper, 204 A.D.2d at 26-27, 618 N.Y.S.2d at
259).
160. Douglas, 205 A.D.2d at 286, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
822 [Vol 11
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requirement to the weight element may be applied retroactively to
pre-Ryan cases. 161
The court reasoned that in Gray and in Gordon, retroactivity of
Ryan was not at issue because once a charge connecting
knowledge to the weight requirement was given to the jury, the
state's failure to prove it was a true question of proof and thus,
no specific objection was required.162 Conversely, the court
implied that if Ryan is to be applied retroactively, and a jury
charge was improper, a specific objection would be required in
order to preserve the issue for appellate review. 163 The court,
however, held that "any retroactive application [of the Ryan rule]
must be precluded" 164 because retroactively applying Ryan would
constitute a "new rule" that would have a "profound effect on the
administration of justice.... ,, 165
In assessing the retroactivity of a new rule, the- court relied on
People v. Mitchell.166 The Mitchell court citing People v.
Pepper167 held that the rule in People v. Antommarchi 68 should
only be applied prospectively. 169 In Pepper, the New York Court
of Appeals stated that in determining the retroactive effect of a
new rule, the following three factors are to be assessed: "(a) the
purpose to be served by the new standards; (b) the extent of
reliance.., on the old standards; and (c) the effect on the
161. Id. at 282, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
162. Id. at 286, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 290, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
165. Id. at 286-87, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 736-37.
166. 80 N.Y.2d 519, 606 N.E.2d 1381, 591 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1992).
167. 53 N.Y.2d 213, 423 N.E.2d 366, 440 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1981).
168. 80 N.Y.2d 247, 604 N.E.2d 95, 590 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1992). In
Antommarcd, the defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the third degree. Id. at 249, 604 N.E.2d at 96, 590
N.Y.S.2d at 34. The court found that the defendant was denied the right to be
present during voir dire, a material stage of the trial in violation of the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I,
section 6 of the New York State Constitution. Id.
169. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d at 524, 606 N.E.2d at 1383, 591 N.Y.S.2d at
992. The Mitchell court found that there was no violation of the defendant's
right to be present during a material stage of the trial by applying
Antommarchi prospectively only. Id.
19951
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administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new
standards." 170 The Mitchell court stated that "the question of
retroactivity is one of State Law. The Supreme Court has no
concern with the uniformity of our law and if only a local
question is presented, the 'state courts generally have the
authority to determine the retroactivity of their own
decisions."' 17 1
In line with the Mitchell court's reasoning, the Douglas court
found that because the case at bar involved the construction of the
word "knowingly" as applied to the weight requirement in
violation of New York Penal Law section 220.18(5), the three-
prong analysis enunciated in Mitchell and Pepper applied to the
case at bar. 172 The court reasoned that retroactive application of
Ryan would create a "dramatic shift from prior procedures and
while not all criminal cases are narcotics cases, thousands of
matters would be affected throughout the state. ' 173 Noting that
there have been 126,278 felony drug convictions in New York
from 1989 to 1993, as well as recognizing that not all the
convictions involved a weight element and a jury trial conviction,
the court stated that "the sheer volume of felony narcotics
convictions over this recent time period provides some indication
of the potential effect of granting collateral relief pursuant to
Ryan to defendants who did not preserve the issue." 174 The court
further stressed that even if only a fraction of trial drug
convictions with the weight element sought judicial review under
Ryan, it "would 'create a substantial burden on the administration
of justice and delay the disposition of countless pending
cases. '" 
17 5
170. Pepper, 53 N.Y.2d at 220, 423 N.E.2d at 369, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
171. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d at 526, 606 N.E.2d at 1384, 591 N.Y.S.2d at
993 (quoting American Trucking Assn's, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 177
(1989)).
172. Douglas, 205 A.D.2d at 287-90, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 737-39.
173. Id. at 287, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
174. Id. at 290, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
175. Id. at 291, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 739 (quoting People v. Mitchell, 80
N.Y.2d 519, 606 N.E.2d 1381, 591 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1992)).
824 [Vol I11
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The court further noted that the retroactive application of Ryan
would also "necessarily increase[] the quantum of proof, required
for such drug convictions[,]" thereby profoundly altering various
evidentiary rulings in drug convictions prior to the Ryan
decision.176 The court stated that "matters once routinely
suppressed in Sandoval1 77 hearings, may now, in certain cases,
be deemed admissible for the purpose of showing a defendant's
prior experience with narcotics in order to prove his 'knowledge
of the weight.' ...,,.78 The court reasoned that because "the
issue of prior experience with narcotics may be relevant in every
narcotics case with a weight element, the prior arrest, convictions
and bad acts may be admitted whether or not these defendants
chose to testify. "179 Thus, in the case at bar, the court noted that
with regard to the defendant's nine prior drug convictions, 180
evidence of how much cocaine a typical vial contained may also
have been admitted to allow the "jury to infer the defendant's
knowledge of the weight simply from the number of vials [he]
possessed" 181 pursuant to a Sandoval ruling. 182
Therefore, the Douglas court held that Ryan is to be applied
prospectively. Thus, when evaluated under the pre-Ryan legal
instruction as given in the court's charge, the trial evidence was
sufficient to support the defendant's conviction and there was no
denial of due process. 183
176. Id. 205 A.D.2d at 287, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 737. Evidently, the
difficulties associated with Ryan's new standard of proof requirement includes
difficulties in proving the defendant's knowledge of the ipecific weight of the
drug. Id.
177. People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N:E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d
849 (1974). The court in Sandoval ruled that a person may obtain a
prospective ruling regarding prior convictions concerning the commission of
specific criminal vicious and immoral acts prior to their being brought out on
cross-examination and prior to deciding whether to take the stand in his own
defense. Id.
178. Douglas, 205 A.D.2d at 291, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
179. Id. at 291-92, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
180. Id. at 291, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
181. Id. at 292, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
182. Id.
183. Id.
19951 825
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The distinction between the federal and state law on the issue of
retroactivity is presented in Griffith v. Kentucky. 184 The federal
law, similar to the state view, disallows collateral attack of final
convictions using the three part test enunciated in Stovall v.
Denno.185 The test analyzes: "(a) the purpose to be served by the
new standards; (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards; and (c) the effect on the
administration of justice of the new standards." 186
Although the Stovall test is similar to the three prong analysis
of Mitchell and Pepper, their application contrasts as the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Griffith provided that "new
rules governing criminal procedure should be retroactive to cases
pending on direct review."' 187 The majority opinion expressed
concern over what would amount to disparate treatment of
similarly situated defendants if the new rule only applied to the
case at bar, while leaving the old rule to apply to cases on direct
review. 188 Thus, if the new rule encompassed some federal
constitutional principles, it would be applied retroactively.
Whereas if the new rule involved solely a construction of state
law, the retroactivity of the new rule would be analyzed under
the three-prong analysis enunciated in Mitchell and Pepper.
People v. Goodwin 189
(decided November 10, 1994)
The defendant, Linnie Goodwin, claimed his right to a speedy
trial, as protected by both the United States Constitution 190 and
184. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
185. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
186. Id. at 297.
187. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 326.
188. Id. at 323.
189. 618 N.Y.S.2d 633 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1994).
190. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial .... "). See United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (stating that the right to a speedy trial acts to
limit pretrial incarceration, to lessen the anxiety accompanying public
association, and to limit delays which may impair an adequate defense).
826 [Vol 11
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